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Abstract
We consider a crowdsourcing model in which n workers are asked to rate the
quality of n items previously generated by other workers. An unknown set of
αn workers generate reliable ratings, while the remaining workers may behave
arbitrarily and possibly adversarially. The manager of the experiment can also
manually evaluate the quality of a small number of items, and wishes to curate
together almost all of the high-quality items with at most an ǫ fraction of low-
quality items. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that this is possible with an amount
of work required of the manager, and each worker, that does not scale with n: the
dataset can be curated with O˜
(
1
βα3ǫ4
)
ratings per worker, and O˜
(
1
βǫ2
)
ratings
by the manager, where β is the fraction of high-quality items. Our results extend
to the more general setting of peer prediction, including peer grading in online
classrooms.
1 Introduction
How can we reliably obtain information from humans, given that the humans themselves are unreli-
able, and might even have incentives to mislead us? Versions of this question arise in crowdsourcing
(Vuurens et al., 2011), collaborative knowledge generation (Priedhorsky et al., 2007), peer grading
in online classrooms (Piech et al., 2013; Kulkarni et al., 2015), aggregation of customer reviews
(Harmon, 2004), and the generation/curation of large datasets (Deng et al., 2009). A key challenge
is to ensure high information quality despite the fact that many people interacting with the system
may be unreliable or even adversarial. This is particularly relevant when raters have an incentive to
collude and cheat as in the setting of peer grading, as well as reviews on sites like Amazon and Yelp,
where artists and firms are incentivized to manufacture positive reviews for their own products and
negative reviews for their rivals (Harmon, 2004; Mayzlin et al., 2012).
One approach to ensuring quality is to use gold sets — questions where the answer is known, which
can be used to assess reliability on unknown questions. However, this is overly constraining — it
does not make sense for open-ended tasks such as knowledge generation on wikipedia, nor even for
crowdsourcing tasks such as “translate this paragraph” or “draw an interesting picture” where there
are different equally good answers. This approach may also fail in settings, such as peer grading in
massive online open courses, where students might collude to inflate their grades.
In this work, we consider the challenge of using crowdsourced human ratings to accurately and
efficiently evaluate a large dataset of content. In some settings, such as peer grading, the end goal
is to obtain the accurate evaluation of each datum; in other settings, such as the curation of a large
dataset, accurate evaluations could be leveraged to select a high-quality subset of a larger set of
variable-quality (perhaps crowd-generated) data.
There are several confounding difficulties that arise in extracting accurate evaluations. First, many
raters may be unreliable and give evaluations that are uncorrelated with the actual item quality;
second, some reliable raters might be harsher or more lenient than others; third, some items may be
harder to evaluate than others and so error rates could vary from item to item, even among reliable
raters; finally, some raters may even collude or want to hack the system. This raises the question:
can we obtain information from the reliable raters, without knowing who they are a priori?
In this work, we answer this question in the affirmative, under surprisingly weak assumptions:
• We do not assume that there is a “gold set” or other cheap way to judge worker performance;
instead, we rely on a small number of our own (potentially noisy) post hoc judgments.
• We do not assume that the majority of workers are reliable.
• We do not assume that the unreliable workers conform to any statistical model; they could
behave fully adversarially, in collusion with each other and with full knowledge of how the
reliable workers behave.
• We do not assume that the reliable worker ratings match our own, but only that they are
“approximately monotonic” in our ratings, in a sense that will be formalized later.
For concreteness, we describe a simple formalization of the crowdsourcing setting (our actual results
hold in a more general setting). There are n raters and n items to evaluate, which have an unknown
quality level in [0, 1]. At least αn workers are “reliable” in that their judgments match our own
in expectation, and they make independent errors. We assign each worker to evaluate at most k
randomly selected items. In addition, we ourselves judge k0 items. Our goal is to recover the
β-quantile: the set T ∗ of the βn highest-quality items. Our main result is the following:
Theorem 1. In the setting above, suppose k ≥ Ω(1/βα3ǫ4) and k0 ≥ Ω(log(1/αβǫ)/βǫ2). Then,
with probability at least 99%, we can identify βn items with average quality at most ǫ worse than
T ∗.
Amazingly, the amount of work that each worker (and we ourselves) has to do does not grow with
n; it depends only on the fraction α of reliable workers and the the desired accuracy ǫ. While the
number of evaluations k for each worker is likely not optimal, we note that the amount of work
k0 required of us is close to optimal: for α ≤ β, it is information theoretically necessary for us
to evaluate Ω(1/βǫ2) items,via a reduction to estimating noisy coin flips (Mannor and Tsitsiklis,
2004).
Why is it necessary to include some of our own ratings? If we did not, and α < 12 , then an adversary
could create a set of dishonest raters that were identical to the reliable raters except with the item
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Figure 1: Illustration of our problem setting. We observe a small number of ratings from each rater
(indicated a blue), which we represent as entries in a matrix A˜ (unobserved ratings in red, treated as
zero by our algorithm). We also rate a small number of items ourself, indicated by r˜. Our goal is to
recover the set T ∗ representing the top β fraction of items under our rating. As an intermediate step,
we recover a matrix M∗ that approximates the top items for each individual rater.
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indices permuted by a random permutation of {1, . . . ,m}. In this case, there is no way to distinguish
the honest from the dishonest raters except by breaking the symmetry with our own ratings.
Our main result holds in a considerably more general setting where we require a weaker form of
inter-rater agreement — for example, our results hold even if some of the reliable raters are harsher
than others, as long as the expected ratings induce approximately the same ranking. The focus on
quantiles rather than raw ratings is what enables this. Note that once we estimate the quantiles, we
can approximately recover the ratings by evaluating a few items in each quantile.
Our technical tools draw on semidefinite programming methods for matrix completion, which
have been used to study graph clustering as well as community detection in the stochastic block
model (Holland et al., 1983; Condon and Karp, 2001). Our setting corresponds to the sparse case
where all nodes have constant degree, which has recently seen great interest (Decelle et al., 2011;
Mossel et al., 2012; 2013b;a; Massoulié, 2014; Guédon and Vershynin, 2014; Mossel et al., 2015;
Chin et al., 2015; Abbe and Sandon, 2015; Makarychev et al., 2015). Makarychev et al. (2015) in
particular provide an algorithm that is robust to adversarial perturbations, but only if the perturbation
has size o(n); see also Cai and Li (2015) for robusness results when the node degree is logarithmic.
Several authors have considered semirandom settings for graph clustering, which allow for some
types of adversarial behavior (Feige and Krauthgamer, 2000; Feige and Kilian, 2001; Coja-Oghlan,
2004; Krivelevich and Vilenchik, 2006; Coja-Oghlan, 2007; Makarychev et al., 2012; Chen et al.,
2014; Guédon and Vershynin, 2014; Moitra et al., 2015; Agarwal et al., 2015). In our setting, these
semirandom models would need to assume that the adversaries are strictly dominated by the reliable
raters, in the sense of having lower expected accuracy on every item; this is implausible as it rules
out most types of strategic behavior. In removing this assumption, we face a key technical chal-
lenge: while previous analyses consider errors relative to a ground truth clustering, in our setting the
ground truth only exists for rows of the matrix corresponding to reliable raters while the remaining
rows could behave arbitrarily even in the limit where all ratings are observed. This necessitates a
more careful analysis, which helps to clarify what properties of a clustering are truly necessary for
identifying it.
2 Algorithm and Intuition
We now describe our recovery algorithm. To fix notation, we assume that there are n raters and m
items, and that we observe a matrix A˜ ∈ [0, 1]n×m: A˜ij = 0 if rater i does not rate item j, and
otherwise A˜ij is the assigned rating, which takes values in [0, 1]. In the settings we care about A˜ is
very sparse — each rater only rates a few items. Remember that our goal is to recover the β-quantile
T ∗ of the best items according to our own rating.
Our algorithm is based on the following intuition: the reliable raters must (approximately) agree on
the ranking of items, and so if we can cluster the rows of A˜ appropriately, then the reliable raters
should form a single very large cluster (of size αn). There can be at most 1α disjoint clusters of this
size, and so we can manually check the accuracy of each large cluster (by checking agreement with
our own rating on a few randomly selected items) and then choose the best one.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for recovering β-quantile matrix M˜ using (unreliable) ratings A˜.
1: Parameters: reliable fraction α, quantile β, tolerance ǫ, number of raters n, number of items m
2: Input: noisy rating matrix A˜
3: Let M˜ be the solution of the optimization problem (1):
maximize 〈A˜,M〉, (1)
subject to 0 ≤Mij ≤ 1 ∀i, j,∑
jMij ≤ βm ∀j, ‖M‖∗ ≤
2
αǫ
√
αβnm,
where ‖ · ‖∗ denotes nuclear norm.
4: Output M˜ .
3
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for recovering an accurate β-quantile T from the β-quantile matrix M˜ .
1: Parameters: tolerance ǫ, reliable fraction α
2: Input: matrix M˜ of approximate β-quantiles, noisy ratings r˜, r˜′
3: Let C′ be the set of αn indices i ∈ [n] for which∑j M˜ij r˜j is largest.
4: T0 ← 1|C′|
∑
i∈C′ M˜i. ⊲ T0 ∈ [0, 1]m
5: do T ← RANDOMIZEDROUND(T0) while 〈T − T0, r˜′〉 < − ǫ4βk
6: return T ⊲ T ∈ {0, 1}m
One major challenge in using the clustering intuition is the sparsity of A˜: any two rows of A˜ will
almost certainly have no ratings in common, so we must exploit the global structure of A˜ to discover
clusters, rather than using pairwise comparisons of rows. The key is to view our problem as a form
of noisy matrix completion — we imagine a matrix A∗ in which all the ratings have been filled in
and all noise from individual ratings has been removed. We define a matrix M∗ that indicates the
top βm items in each row of A∗: M∗ij = 1 if item j has one of the top βm ratings from rater i, and
M∗ij = 0 otherwise (this differs from the actual definition of M∗ given in Section 4, but is the same
in spirit). If we could recover M∗, we would be close to obtaining the clustering we wanted.
The key observation that allows us to approximate M∗ given only the noisy, incomplete A˜ is that
M∗ has low-rank structure: since all of the reliable raters agree with each other, their rows in M∗
are all identical, and so there is an (αn) × m submatrix of M∗ with rank 1. This inspires the
low-rank matrix completion algorithm for recovering M˜ given in Algorithm 1. Each row of M is
constrained to have sum at most βm, and M as a whole is constrained to have nuclear norm ‖M‖∗
at most 2αǫ
√
αβnm. Recall that the nuclear norm is the sum of the singular values of M ; in the
same way that the ℓ1-norm is a convex surrogate for the ℓ0-norm, the nuclear norm acts as a convex
surrogate for the rank of M (i.e., number of non-zero singular values). The optimization problem (1)
therefore chooses a set of βm items in each row to maximize the corresponding values in A˜, while
constraining the item sets to have low rank (where low rank is relaxed to low nuclear norm to obtain
a convex problem). This low-rank constraint acts as a strong regularizer that quenches the noise in
A˜.
Once we have recovered M˜ using Algorithm 1, it remains to recover a specific set T that approxi-
mates the β-quantile according to our ratings. Algorithm 2 provides a recipe for doing so: first, rate
k0 items at random, obtaining the vector r˜: r˜j = 0 if we did not rate item j, and otherwise r˜j is
the (possibly noisy) rating that we assign to item j. Next, score each row M˜i based on the noisy
ratings
∑
j M˜ij r˜j , and let T0 be the average of the αn highest-scoring M˜i. Finally, use randomized
rounding to turn the vector T0 ∈ [0, 1]m into a discrete vector T ∈ {0, 1}m, and treat T as the
indicator function of a set approximating the β-quantile (see Section 5 for details of the rounding
algorithm).
In summary, given a noisy rating matrix A˜, we will first run Algorithm 1 to recover a β-quantile
matrix M˜ for each rater, and then run Algorithm 2 to recover our personal β-quantile from M˜ .
Possible attacks by adversaries. In our algorithm, the adversaries can influence M˜i for reliable
raters i via the nuclear norm constraint (note that the other constraints are separable across rows).
This makes sense because the nuclear norm is what causes us to pool global structure across raters
(and thus potentially pool bad information). In order to limit this influence, the constraint on the
nuclear norm is weaker than is typical by a factor of 2ǫ ; it is not clear to us whether this is actually
necessary or due to a loose analysis. (Note that M∗C–M∗ restricted to the reliable rows–has nuclear
norm
√
αβnm, since it is the αn×βm all-1s matrix padded by zeros; the constraint on ‖M‖∗ must
be at least 1α times as large as this since the adversaries could produce
1
α permuted copies of M
∗
C .)
The constraint
∑
jMij ≤ βm is not typical in the literature. For instance, (Chen et al., 2014) place
no constraint on the sum of each row in M (instead of recovering the β-quantile, they normalize A˜
to lie in [−1, 1]m×m and recover the items with a positive rating). Our row normalization constraint
prevents an attack in which a spammer rates a random subset of items as high as possible and rates
the remaining items as low as possible. If the actual set of high-quality items has density much
smaller than 50%, then the spammer gains undue influence relative to honest raters that only rate
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm for obtaining (unreliable) ratings matrix A˜ and noisy ratings r˜, r˜′.
1: Input: number of raters n, number of items m, and ratings per rater k.
2: Initially assign each rater to each item independently with probability k/m.
3: For every rater assigned more than 2k items, un-assign items until there are 2k remaining.
4: For every item assigned to more than 2k raters, un-assign raters until there are 2k remaining.
5: Have the raters submit ratings of their assigned items, and let A˜ denote the resulting matrix of
ratings with missing entries fill in with zeros.
6: Generate each of r˜ and r˜′ by rating items with probability k0m (fill in missing entries with zeros)
7: Output A˜, r˜, and r˜′
e.g. 10% of the items highly. Normalizing M to have a fixed row sum prevents this; see Section B
for details.
3 Assumptions and Approach
We now state our assumptions more formally, state the general form of our results, and outline the
key ingredients of the proof. In our setting, we can query a rater i ∈ [m] and item j ∈ [m] to obtain
a rating A˜ij ∈ [0, 1]. Let r∗ ∈ [0, 1]m denote the vector of true ratings of the items. We can also
query an item j (by rating it ourself) to obtain a noisy rating r˜j such that E[r˜j ] = r∗j .
Let C ⊆ [n] be the set of reliable raters, where |C| ≥ αn. Our main assumption is that the reliable
raters make independent errors:
Assumption 1 (Independence). When we query a pair (i, j), and i ∈ C, we obtain an output A˜ij
whose value is independent of all of the other queries so far. Similarly, when we query an item j, we
obtain an output r˜j that is independent of all of the other queries so far.
Note that Assumption 1 allows the unreliable ratings to depend on all previous ratings and also
allows arbitrary collusion among the unreliable raters. In our algorithm, we will generate our own
ratings after querying everyone else, which ensures that at least r˜ is independent of the adversaries.
We need a way to formalize the idea that the reliable raters agree with us. To this end, for i ∈ C let
A∗ij be the expected rating that rater i assigns to item j. We want A∗ to be roughly increasing in r∗:
Definition 1 (Monotonic raters). We say that the reliable raters are (L, ǫ)-monotonic if
r∗j − r∗j′ ≤ L · (A∗ij −A∗ij′ ) + ǫ (2)
whenever r∗j ≥ r∗j′ , and for all i ∈ C and all j, j′ ∈ [m].
The (L, ǫ)-monotonicity property says that if we think that one item is substantially better than
another item, the reliable raters should think so as well. As an example, suppose that our own
ratings are binary (r∗j ∈ {0, 1}) and that each rating A˜i,j matches r∗j with probability 35 . Then
A∗i,j =
2
5 +
1
5r
∗
j , and hence the ratings are (5, 0)-monotonic. In general, the monotonicity property
is fairly mild — if the reliable ratings are not (L, ǫ)-monotonic, it is not clear that they should even
be called reliable!
Algorithm for collecting ratings. Under the model given in Assumption 1, our algorithm for col-
lecting ratings is given in Algorithm 3. Given integers k and k0, Algorithm 3 assigns each rater
at most 2k ratings, and assigns us 2k0 ratings in expectation. The output is a noisy rating matrix
A˜ ∈ [0, 1]n×m as well as noisy rating vectors r˜, r˜′ ∈ [0, 1]m (we need to create two independent
rating vectors for technical reasons; in practice we can use a single vector). Our main result states
that we can use A˜ and r˜ to estimate the β-quantile T ∗; throughout we will assume that m is at least
n.
Theorem 2. Let m ≥ n. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, that the reliable raters are (L, ǫ0)-
monotonic, and that we run Algorithm 3 to obtain noisy ratings, with k ≥ Ω
(
log3(1/δ)
βα3ǫ4
m
n
)
and
k0 ≥ Ω
(
log(1/αβǫδ)
βǫ2
)
. Then, with probability 1− δ, Algorithms 1 and 2 recover a set T satisfying
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1βm

∑
j∈T∗
r∗j −
∑
j∈T
r∗j

 ≤ (L+ 1) · ǫ+ ǫ0. (3)
Note that the amount of work for the raters scales as mn . Some dependence on
m
n is necessary, since
we need to make sure that every item gets rated at least once.
The proof of Theorem 2 can be split into two parts: analyzing Algorithm 1 (Section 4), and analyzing
Algorithm 2 (Section 5). At a high level, analyzing Algorithm 1 involves showing that the nuclear
norm constraint in (1) imparts sufficient noise robustness while not allowing the adversary too much
influence over the reliable rows of M˜ . Analyzing Algorithm 2 is far more straightforward, and
requires only standard concentration inequalities and a standard randomized rounding idea (though
the latter is perhaps not well-known, so we will explain it briefly in Section 5).
4 Recovering M˜ (Algorithm 1)
The goal of this section is to show that solving the optimization problem (1) recovers a matrix M˜
that approximates the β-quantile of r∗ in the following sense:
Proposition 1. Under the conditions of Theorem 2, Algorithm 1 outputs a matrix M˜ satisfying
1
|C|
1
βm
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m]
(T ∗j − M˜i,j)A∗ij ≤ ǫ, (4)
where T ∗j = 1 if j lies in the β-quantile of r∗, and is 0 otherwise.
Proposition 1 says that the row M˜i is good according to rater i’s ratings A∗i . Note that (L, ǫ0)-
monotonicity then implies that M˜i is also good according to r∗. In particular (see A.2 for details)
1
|C|
1
βm
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m]
(T ∗j − M˜ij)r∗j ≤ L ·
1
|C|
1
βm
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m]
(T ∗j − M˜ij)A∗ij + ǫ0 ≤ L · ǫ + ǫ0. (5)
Proving Proposition 1 involves two major steps: showing (a) that the nuclear norm constraint in (1)
imparts noise-robustness, and (b) that the constraint does not allow the adversaries to influence M˜C
too much. (For a matrix X we let XC denote the rows indexed by C and XC the remaining rows.)
In a bit more detail, if we let M∗ denote a denoised version of M˜ , and B denote a denoised version
of A˜, we first show (Lemma 1) that 〈B, M˜ − M∗〉 ≥ −ǫ′ for some ǫ′ determined below. This
is established via the matrix concentration inequalities in Le and Vershynin (2015). Lemma 1 al-
ready suffices for standard approaches (e.g., Guédon and Vershynin, 2014), but in our case we must
grapple with the issue that the rows of B could be arbitrary outside of C, and hence closeness ac-
cording to B may not imply actual closeness between M˜ and M∗. Our main technical contribution,
Lemma 2, shows that 〈BC , M˜C −M∗C 〉 ≥ 〈B, M˜ −M∗〉 − ǫ′; that is, closeness according to B
implies closeness according to BC . We can then restrict attention to the reliable raters, and obtain
Proposition 1.
Part 1: noise-robustness. Let B be the matrix satisfying BC = kmA
∗
C , BC = A˜C , which denoises
A˜ on C. The scaling km is chosen so that E[A˜C ] ≈ BC . Also define R ∈ Rn×m by Rij = T ∗j .
Ideally, we would like to have MC = RC , i.e., M matches T ∗ on all the rows of C. In light of this,
we will let M∗ be the solution to the following “corrected” program, which we don’t have access to
(since it involves knowledge of A∗ and C), but which will be useful for analysis purposes:
maximize 〈B,M〉, (6)
subject to MC = RC , 0 ≤Mij ≤ 1 ∀i, j,∑
jMij ≤ βm ∀i, ‖M‖∗ ≤
2
αǫ
√
αβnm
Importantly, (6) enforces M∗ij = T ∗j for all i ∈ C. Lemma 1 shows that M˜ is “close” to M∗:
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‖M‖∗ ≤ ρ
MC = RC
B
BC−ZC
MC
MC
M∗
〈B
C
−Z
C
,M
∗
−M
〉≤
ǫ M˜
Figure 2: Illustration of our Lagrangian duality argument, and of the role of Z . The blue region
represents the nuclear norm constraint and the gray region the remaining constraints. Because the
blue region slopes downwards, a decrease in MC can be offset by an increase in MC when measuring〈B,M〉. The vector B − Z accounts for this offset, and the red region represents the constraint
〈BC − ZC ,M∗C −MC〉 ≤ ǫ, which is guaranteed to contain M˜ .
Lemma 1. Let m ≥ n. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that k = Ω
(
log3(1/δ)
βα3ǫ4
m
n
)
. Then, the
solution M˜ to (1) performs nearly as well as M∗ under B; specifically, with probability 1− δ,
〈B, M˜〉 ≥ 〈B,M∗〉 − ǫαβkn. (7)
Note that M˜ is not necessarily feasible for (6), because of the constraintMC = RC ; Lemma 1 merely
asserts that M˜ approximates M∗ in objective value. The proof of Lemma 1, given in Section A.3,
primarily involves establishing a uniform deviation result; if we let P denote the feasible set for (1),
then we wish to show that |〈A˜ − B,M〉| ≤ 12ǫαβkn for all M ∈ P . This would imply that the
objectives of (1) and (6) are essentially identical, and so optimizing one also optimizes the other.
Using the inequality |〈A˜ − B,M〉| ≤ ‖A˜ − B‖op‖M‖∗, where ‖ · ‖op denotes operator norm, it
suffices to establish a matrix concentration inequality bounding ‖A˜ − B‖op. This bound follows
from the general matrix concentration result of Le and Vershynin (2015), stated in Section A.1.
Part 2: bounding the influence of adversaries. We next show that the nuclear norm constraint
does not give the adversaries too much influence over the de-noised program (6); this is the most
novel aspect of our argument.
Suppose that the constraint on ‖M‖∗ were not present in (6). Then the adversaries would have no
influence on M∗C , because all the remaining constraints in (6) are separable across rows. How can
we quantify the effect of this nuclear norm constraint? We exploit Lagrangian duality, which allows
us to replace constraints with appropriate modifications to the objective function.
To gain some intuition, consider Figure 2. The key is that the Lagrange multiplier ZC can bound the
amount that 〈B,M〉 can increase due to changing M outside of C. If we formalize this and analyze
Z in detail, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 2. Let m ≥ n. Suppose that k = Ω
(
log3(1/δ)
αβǫ2
m
n
)
. Then with probability at least 1 − δ
there exists a matrix Z with rank(Z) = 1, ‖Z‖F ≤ ǫk
√
αβn/m such that
〈BC − ZC ,M∗C −MC〉 ≤ 〈B,M∗ −M〉 for all M ∈ P . (8)
By localizing 〈B,M∗ −M〉 to C via (8), Lemma 2 bounds the effect that the adversaries can have
on M˜C . It is therefore the key technical tool powering our results, and is proved in Section A.4.
Proposition 1 is proved from Lemmas 1 and 2 in Section A.5.
5 Recovering T (Algorithm 2)
In this section we show that if M˜ satisfies the conclusion of Proposition 1, then Algorithm 2 recovers
a set T that approximates T ∗ well. Formally, we show the following:
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Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and k0 ≥ Ω
(
log(1/αβǫδ)
βǫ2
)
. With probability 1 − δ,
Algorithm 2 outputs a set T satisfying
1
βm
∑
j∈T
r∗j ≥

 1
βm
1
|C|
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m]
M˜ijr
∗
j

− ǫ. (9)
The validity of this procedure hinges on two results. First, establish a concentration bound showing
that
∑
j M˜ij r˜j is close to
k0
m
∑
j M˜ijr
∗
j for all i ∈ C, which implies that the αn best rows of M˜
according to r˜ also look good according to r∗. This yields the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let C′ be the αn best rows according to r˜, as in Algorithm 2. Suppose that r˜ satisfies
Assumption 1 and that k0 ≥ Ω
(
log(1/αδ)
βǫ2
)
. Then, with probability 1− δ, we have
1
αn
∑
i∈C′
( ∑
j∈[m]
M˜ijr
∗
j
)
≥ 1|C|
∑
i∈C
( ∑
j∈[m]
M˜ijr
∗
j
)
− ǫ
4
βm. (10)
See Section A.6 for a proof. The idea is to establish a uniform bound showing that∑
i∈S
∑
j∈[m] M˜ij(r˜j − k0m r∗j ) is small for any set of αn rows S, and hence that greedily taking
the αn best rows according to r˜ is almost as good as taking the αn best rows according to r∗. We
improve over a naïve union bound by exploiting power mean inequalities on cumulant functions.
Having recovered a set C′ of good rows, define their average T0 ∈ [0, 1]m as T0 def= 1|C′|
∑
i∈C′ M˜i.
We need to turn T0 into a binary vector so that Algorithm 2 can output a set; we do so via randomized
rounding, obtaining a vector T ∈ {0, 1}m such that E[T0] = T . Our rounding procedure is given in
Algorithm 4; the following lemma, proved in A.7, asserts its correctness:
Lemma 4. The output T of Algorithm 4 satisfies E[T ] = T0, ‖T ‖0 ≤ βm.
Algorithm 4 Randomized rounding algorithm.
1: procedure RANDOMIZEDROUND(T0) ⊲ T0 ∈ [0, 1]m satisfies ‖T0‖1 ≤ βm
2: Let s be the vector of partial sums of T0 ⊲ i.e., sj = (T0)1 + · · ·+ (T0)j
3: Sample u ∼ Uniform([0, 1]).
4: T ← [0, . . . , 0] ∈ Rm
5: for z = 0 to βm− 1 do
6: Find j such that u+ z ∈ [sj−1, sj). ⊲ if no such j exists, skip the next step
7: Tj ← 1
8: end for
9: return T
10: end procedure
The remainder of the proof involves lower-bounding the probability that T is accepted in each stage
of the while loop in Algorithm 2. We refer the reader to Section A.8 for details.
6 Open Directions and Related Work
Future Directions On the theoretical side, perhaps the most immediate open question is whether it is
possible to improve the dependence of k (the amount of work required per worker) on the parameters
α, β, and ǫ. It is tempting to hope that when m = n a tight result would have k = Θ
(
log(1/α)
min(α,β)ǫ2
)
,
in loose analogy to recent results for the stochastic block model (Banks and Moore, 2016).
Our results also leave some open questions for variations on our setting. One concerns the regime
wherem≪ n: in this case, can we get by with much less work per rater? Another question concerns
adaptivity: if the choice of queries is based on previous worker ratings, can we reduce the amount
of work? We would be quite interested in answers to either question.
Related work. Our setting is closely related to the problem of peer prediction (Miller et al., 2005),
in which we wish to obtain truthful information from a population of raters by exploiting inter-rater
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agreement. While several mechanisms have been proposed for these tasks, they typically assume
that rater accuracy is observable online (Resnick and Sami, 2007), that raters are rational agents max-
imizing a payoff function (Dasgupta and Ghosh, 2013; Kamble et al., 2015; Shnayder et al., 2016),
that the workers follow a simple statistical model (Karger et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014; Zhou et al.,
2015), or some combination of the above (Shah and Zhou, 2015; Shah et al., 2015).
The work most close to ours is Christiano (2014; 2016), which studies online collaborative prediction
in the presence of adversaries; roughly, when raters interact with an item they predict its quality and
afterwards observe the actual quality; the goal is to minimize the number of incorrect predictions
among the honest raters. This differs from our setting in that (i) the raters are trying to learn the item
qualities as part of the task, and (ii) there is no requirement to induce a final global estimate of the
high-quality items, which is necessary for estimating quantiles. It seems possible however that there
are theoretical ties between this setting and ours, which would be interesting to explore.
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A Deferred Proofs
A.1 Matrix Concentration Bound of Le and Vershynin (2015)
For ease of reference, here we state the matrix concentration bound from Le and Vershynin (2015),
which we make use of in the proofs below.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 2.1 in Le and Vershynin (2015)). Given an s×s matrix P with entries Pi,j ∈
[0, 1], and a random matrix A with the properties that 1) each entry of A is chosen independently, 2)
E[Ai,j ] = Pi,j , and 3) Ai,j ∈ [0, 1], then for any r ≥ 1, the following holds with probability at least
1− s−r: let d = s ·maxi,j Pi,j , and modify any subset of at most 10s/d rows and/or columns of A
by arbitrarily decreasing the value of nonzero elements of those rows or columns to form the matrix
A′ with entries in [0, 1], then
||A′ − P ||op ≤ Cr3/2
(√
d+
√
d′
)
,
where d′ is the maximum ℓ2 norm of any row or column of A′, and C is an absolute constant.
Note: The proof of this theorem in Le and Vershynin (2015) shows that the statement continues to
hold in the slightly more general setting where the entries of A are chosen independently according
to random variables with bounded variance and sub-Gaussian tails, rather than just random variables
restricted to the interval [0, 1].
A.2 Details of Lipschitz Bound (Equation 5)
The proof essentially consists of matching up each value r∗j , for j ∈ T ∗, with a set of values r∗j′ ,
j′ ≥ j, where the corresponding M˜i,j′ sum to 1; we can then invoke the condition (2). Unfortunately,
expressing this idea formally is a bit notationally cumbersome.
Before we start, we observe that the Lipschitz condition (2) implies that, if r∗j ≥ r∗j′ , then r∗j − r∗j′ ≤
L · (A∗i,j −A∗i,j′)+ ǫ0. It is this form of (2) that we will make use of below.
Now, let Ij = I[j ∈ T ∗], and without loss of generality suppose that the indices j are such that
r∗1 ≥ r∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ r∗m. For a vector v ∈ [0, 1]m, define
h(τ, v)
def
= inf{j |
j∑
j′=1
vj′ ≥ τ}, (11)
where h(τ, v) =∞ if no such j exists. We observe that for any vector v ∈ [0, 1]m, we have∑
j∈[m]
vjr
∗
j =
∫ ∞
0
r∗h(τ ;v)dτ, (12)
where we define r∗∞ = 0 (note that the integrand is therefore 0 for any τ ≥ ‖v‖1). Hence, we have∑
j∈T∗
r∗j −
∑
j∈[m]
M˜i,jr
∗
j =
∑
j∈[m]
Ijr
∗
j −
∑
j∈[m]
M˜i,jr
∗
j (13)
=
∫ βm
0
r∗h(τ,I) − r∗h(τ,M˜i)dτ (14)
(i)
≤
∫ βm
0
[
L ·
(
A∗h(τ,I) −A∗h(τ,M˜i)
)
+ ǫ0
]
dτ (15)
= L ·

∑
j∈[m]
IjA
∗
j −
∑
j∈[m]
M˜i,jA
∗
j

+ βmǫ0 (16)
= L ·

∑
j∈T∗
A∗j −
∑
j∈[m]
M˜i,jA
∗
j

 + βmǫ0, (17)
which implies (5). The key step is (i), which uses the fact that h(τ, I) ≤ h(τ, M˜i) (because I is
maximally concentrated on the left-most indices of [m]), and hence r∗h(τ,I) ≥ r∗h(τ,M˜i).
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A.3 Stability Under Noise (Proof of Lemma 1)
By Hölder’s inequality, we have that |〈A˜−B,M〉| ≤ ‖A˜−B‖op‖M‖∗. We now leverage Theorem 3
to bound ‖A˜ − B‖op. To apply the theorem, first note that from the construction of A˜ given in
Algorithm 3, A˜ can be constructed by first having the raters rate each item independently with
probability k/m to form matrix A˜o and then removing ratings from the “heavy” rows (i.e. rows with
more than 2k ratings), and “heavy” columns (i.e. columns with more than 2k) ratings. By standard
Chernoff bounds, the probability that a given row or column will need to be “pruned” is at most
e−k/3 ≤ 2/k, and hence from the independence of the rows, the probability that more than 5n/k
rows are “heavy” is at most e−2n/3k. The probability that there are more than 5n/k heavy columns
is identically bounded.
Note that the expectation of the portion of A˜o corresponding to the reliable raters is exactly the
corresponding portion of matrix B, and with probability at least 1− 2e−2n/3k, at most 10n/k rows
and/or columns of A˜o are pruned to form A˜. Consider padding matrices A˜ and B with zeros, to
form the n × n matrices A˜′ and B′. With probability 1 − 2e−2n/3k the conditions of Theorem 3
now apply to A˜′ and B′, with the parameters d = nkm ≤ k, and d′ = 2k. Hence for any r ≥ 1, with
probability at least 1− 2e−2n/3k − n−r
‖A˜−B‖op = ‖A˜′ − B′‖op ≤ Cr3/2
√
k,
for some absolute constant C.
By assumption, ‖M˜‖∗ ≤ 2αǫ
√
αβnm and ‖M∗‖∗ ≤ 2αǫ
√
αβnm. Hence setting r = log(1/δ), and
k ≥ C′ log3(1δ ) m/nǫ4α3β for some absolute constant C′, we have that with probability at least 1 − δ,
we have
|〈A˜−B, M˜〉| ≤ 1
2
ǫαβkn,
and |〈A˜−B,M∗〉| is bounded identically.
To conclude, we have the following:
〈B, M˜〉 ≥ 〈A˜, M˜〉 − 1
2
ǫαβkn (18)
≥ 〈A˜,M∗〉 − 1
2
ǫαβkn (since M˜ is optimal for A˜) (19)
≥ 〈B,M∗〉 − ǫαβkn, (20)
which completes the proof.
A.4 Bounding the Effect of Adversaries (Proof of Lemma 2)
In this section we prove Lemma 2. Let P0 be the superset of P where we have removed the nuclear
norm constraint. By Lagrangian duality we know that there is some µ such that maximizing 〈B,M〉
over P ∩ {MC = RC} is equivalent to maximizing fµ(M) def= 〈B,M〉 + µ
(
2
ǫα
√
αβnm− ‖M‖∗
)
over P0 ∩ {MC = RC}.
We start by bounding µ. We claim that µ ≤ ǫk
√
αβn/m. To show this, we will first show that
〈B,M〉 cannot get too large. Let E be the set of (i, j) for which ratings are observed, and define the
matrix B′ as (B′)ij = km + I[(i, j) ∈ E ] (Bij − 1); note that (B − B′)ij = I[(i, j) ∈ E ]− km . For
any M ∈ P0, we have
〈B,M〉 ≤ 〈B′,M〉+ 〈B −B′,M〉 (21)
≤ βkn+ ‖B −B′‖op‖M‖∗ (22)
(i)
≤ βkn+ log(1/δ)3/22
√
2k‖M‖∗ (23)
(ii)
≤ k
(
βn+
ǫ
√
αβn/m
2
‖M‖∗
)
. (24)
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In (i) we used the matrix concentration inequality of Theorem 3, in a similar manner as was used
in our proof of Lemma 1. Specifically, we consider padding B and B′ with zeros so as to make
both into n × n matrices. Provided the total number of raters and items whose initial assignments
are removed in the second and third steps of the rater/item assignment procedure (Algorithm 3)
is bounded by 10n/k, which occurs with probability at least 1 − δ/2 given our choice of k, then
Theorem 3 applies with r = log(1/δ), and d and d′ bounded by 2k, yielding an operator norm
bound of r3/2(
√
k+
√
2k) ≤ log(1/δ)3/22
√
2k, that holds with probability 1− n−r > 1− δ/2. In
(ii) we plug in our assumption k = Ω
(
log(1/δ)3
αβǫ2
m
n
)
.
Now, suppose that we take µ0 = ǫ
√
αβn/mk and optimize 〈B,M〉 − µ0‖M‖∗ over P0 ∩ {MC =
RC}. By the above inequalities, we have 〈B,M〉 − µ0‖M‖∗ ≤ βkn − ǫ
√
αβn/mk
2 ‖M‖∗, and so
any M with ‖M‖∗ > 2ǫα
√
αβnm cannot possibly be optimal, since the solution M = 0 would be
better. Hence, µ0 is a large enough Lagrange multiplier to ensure that M ∈ P , and so µ ≤ µ0 =
ǫk
√
αβn/m, as claimed.
We next characterize the subgradient of fµ at M = M∗. Define the projection matrix P as
Pi,i′ =
{
1
|C| : i, i
′ ∈ C
δi,i′ : else
. (25)
Thus PM = M if and only if all rows in C are equal to each other. In particular, PM = M
whenever MC = RC . Now, since M∗ is the maximum of fµ(M) over all M ∈ P0 ∩ {MC = RC},
there must be some G ∈ ∂fµ(M∗) such that 〈G,M −M∗〉 ≤ 0 for all M ∈ P0 ∩ {MC = RC}.
The following lemma says that without loss of generality we can assume that PG = G:
Lemma 5. Suppose that G ∈ ∂f(M∗) satisfies 〈G,M −M∗〉 ≤ 0 for all M ∈ P0 ∩ {MC = RC}.
Then, PG satisfies the same property, and lies in ∂f(M∗) as well.
We can further note (by differentiating fµ) that G = B − µZ0, where ‖Z0‖op ≤ 11. Then PG =
PB − µPZ0 = B − µPZ0. Let r(M) denote the matrix where MC is replaced with RC (so
r(M) ∈ P0 ∩ {RC = MC} whenever M ∈ P0). The rest of the proof is basically algebra; for any
M ∈ P , we have
〈B,M −M∗〉
(i)
≤ fµ(M)− fµ(M∗) (26)
(ii)
≤ 〈B − µPZ0,M −M∗〉 (27)
= 〈B − µPZ0,M − r(M)〉 + 〈B − µPZ0, r(M) −M∗〉 (28)
(iii)
≤ 〈B − µPZ0,M − r(M)〉 (29)
(iv)
= 〈BC − µ(PZ0)C ,MC − r(M)C〉 (30)
= 〈BC − µ(PZ0)C ,MC −M∗C 〉, (31)
where (i) is by complementary slackness (either µ = 0 or ‖M∗‖∗ = 2αǫ
√
αβnm); (ii) is concavity
of fµ, and the fact that B − µPZ0 is a subgradient; (iii) is the property from Lemma 5 (〈B −
µPZ0, r(M)−M∗〉 ≤ 0 since r(M) ∈ P0); and (iv) is because M and r(M) only differ on C.
To finish, we will take Z = µ(PZ0)C . We note that ‖Z‖op = ‖µ(PZ0)C‖op ≤ µ‖PZ0‖op ≤
µ‖Z0‖op ≤ µ. Moreover, Z has rank 1 and so ‖Z‖F = ‖Z‖op ≤ µ ≤ ǫk
√
αβn/m, as was to be
shown.
Proof of Lemma 5. First, since PM = M for all M ∈ P0 ∩ {MC = RC}, and PM∗ = M∗, we
have 〈PG,M −M∗〉 = 〈G,P (M −M∗)〉 = 〈G,M −M∗〉 ≤ 0. We thus only need to show that
1This is due to the more general result that, for any norm ‖ · ‖, the subgradient of ‖ · ‖ at any point has dual
norm at most 1.
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PG is still a subgradient of fµ. Indeed, we have (for arbitrary M )
〈PG,M −M∗〉 = 〈G,PM −M∗〉 (32)
(i)
≥ fµ(PM)− fµ(M∗) (33)
= 〈B,PM〉 − µ‖PM‖∗ − fµ(M∗) (34)
= 〈B,M〉 − µ‖PM‖∗ − fµ(M∗) (35)
(ii)
≥ 〈B,M〉 − µ‖M‖∗ − fµ(M∗) (36)
= fµ(M)− fµ(M∗), (37)
where (i) is because G ∈ ∂fµ(M∗), and (ii) is because projecting decreases the nuclear norm.
Since the inequality 〈PG,M −M∗〉 ≥ fµ(M)− fµ(M∗) is the defining property for PG to lie in
∂fµ(M
∗), the proof is complete.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we will prove Proposition 1 from Lemmas 1 and 2. We start by plugging in M˜ for
M in Lemma 2. This yields 〈BC − ZC ,M∗C − M˜C〉 ≤ 〈B,M∗ − M˜〉 ≤ ǫαβkn by Lemma 1. On
the other hand, we have
|〈ZC ,M∗C − M˜C〉| ≤ ‖ZC‖F‖M∗C − M˜C‖F (38)
≤ ǫ
√
αβnk/m
√
‖M∗C − M˜C‖1‖M∗C − M˜C‖∞ (39)
≤ ǫ
√
αβnk/m
√
2αβmn =
√
2ǫαβkn. (40)
Putting these together, we obtain 〈BC ,M∗C − M˜C〉 ≤ (1 +
√
2)ǫαβkn. Expanding 〈BC ,M∗C − M˜C〉
as km
∑
i∈C
(∑
j∈[m](Rij − M˜ij)A∗ij
)
, we obtain
1
|C|
1
βm
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m]
(T ∗j − M˜ij)A∗ij ≤ (1 +
√
2)ǫ. (41)
Scaling ǫ by a factor of 1 +
√
2 yields the desired result.
A.6 Concentration Bounds for r˜ (Proof of Lemma 3)
We start by stating a lemma which will be useful both here and later:
Lemma 6. Let M ∈ [0, 1]n×m be a matrix of random variables such that ‖Mi‖22 ≤ βm for all
rows i ∈ [n]. Define the deviation Di def=
∑m
j=1 M˜ij(r˜j − k0m r∗j ). Then, for k0 ≥ 3 log(2n/vδ)min(ǫ,ǫ2) , with
probability 1− δ, we have
∣∣∣ 1|V |∑i∈V Di∣∣∣ ≤ ǫβk0 for all sets V ⊆ [n] with |V | ≥ v.
Given Lemma 6, the rest of the proof is fairly straightforward. Noting that ǫ ≤ 1 and applying this
conclusion for v = αn, and k0 ≥ 3·8
2 log(2/αδ)
ǫ2 , we see that
1
αn
∑
i∈C′
∑
j∈[m]
M˜ijr
∗
ij ≥
1
αn
m
k0
∑
i∈C′
∑
j∈[m]
M˜ij r˜ij − ǫ
8
βm (42)
≥ 1|C|
m
k0
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m]
M˜ij r˜ij − ǫ
8
βm (43)
≥ 1|C|
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m]
M˜ijr
∗
ij −
ǫ
4
βm, (44)
as was to be shown.
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Proof of Lemma 6. Define the cumulant function ci(λ)
def
= log(Er˜[exp(λDi)]). We have
ci(λ) = log(Er˜[exp(λ
∑
j
M˜ij(r˜j − (k0/m)r∗j ))]) (45)
=
∑
j
log(Er˜[exp(λM˜ij(r˜j − (k0/m)r∗j ))]) (46)
(i)
≤
∑
j
(eλ − λ− 1)M˜2ij Var[r˜j ] (47)
≤ (eλ − λ− 1)
∑
j
M˜2ij
k0
m
(48)
≤ (eλ − λ− 1)βk0, (49)
where (i) is Bennet’s inequality.
We also consider the cumulant function for the maximum average deviation over possible sets V :
Cv(λ)
def
= log
(
Er˜
[
max
|V |≥v
exp
(
λ
|V |
∑
i∈V
Di
)])
. (50)
To bound Cv(λ), we use the power mean inequality
max
|V |≥v
exp
(
λ
|V |
∑
i∈V
Di
)
≤ max
|V |≥v
1
|V |
∑
i∈V
exp (λDi) (51)
≤ max
|V |≥v
1
|V |
n∑
i=1
exp (λDi) (52)
≤ 1
v
n∑
i=1
exp (λDi) . (53)
Therefore,
Cv(λ) = log
(
Er˜
[
max
|V |≥v
exp
(
λ
|V |
∑
i∈V
Di
)])
(54)
≤ log
(
Er˜
[
1
v
n∑
i=1
exp (λDi)
])
(55)
≤ log
(n
v
exp
(
(eλ − λ− 1)βk0
)) (56)
= log(n/v) + (eλ − λ− 1)βk0. (57)
By applying a standard Chernoff bound argument to Cv(λ), we obtain
P
[
max
|V |≥v
∣∣∣∣∣ 1|V |
∑
i∈V
Di
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫβk0
]
≤ 2n
v
exp
(
−βk0
3
min(ǫ, ǫ2)
)
. (58)
In particular, for k0 ≥ 3 log(2n/vδ)βmin(ǫ,ǫ2) , we have with probability 1 − δ that
∣∣∣ 1|V |∑i∈V Di∣∣∣ ≤ ǫβk0 for
all sets V ⊆ [n] with |V | ≥ v, as was to be shown.
A.7 Correctness of Randomized Rounding (Proof of Lemma 4)
Our goal is to show that the output of Algorithm 4 satisfies E[T ] = T0. First, observe that since
(T0)j ≤ 1 for all j, each interval [sj−1, sj) has length at most 1, and so the for loop over z never
picks the same index j twice. Moreover, the probability that j is included in T0 is exactly sj−sj−1 =
(T0)j . The result follows by linearity of expectation.
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A.8 Correctness of Algorithm 2 (Proof of Proposition 2)
First, we claim that with probability 1 − δ, we will invoke RandomizedRound at most 4 log(1/δ)ǫβ
times. To see this, note that E[〈T, r˜′〉] = 〈T0, r˜′〉, and 〈T, r˜′〉 ∈ [0, k0] almost surely. By Markov’s
inequality, the probability that 〈T, r˜′〉 < 〈T0, r˜′〉 − ǫ4βk0 is at most k0−〈T0,r˜
′〉
k0−〈T0,r˜′〉+(ǫ/4)βk0
. We can
assume that 〈T0, r˜′〉 ≥ (ǫ/4)βk0 (since otherwise we accept T with probability 1), in which case the
preceding expression is bounded by k0−(ǫ/4)βk0k0 = 1 − ǫ4β. Therefore, the probability of accepting
T in any given iteration of the while loop is at least ǫ4β, and so the probability of accepting at least
once in 4 log(1/δ)ǫβ iterations is indeed at least 1− δ.
Next, for k0 ≥ Ω
(
log(2/ǫβδ)
βǫ2
)
, we can make the probability that |〈T, r˜− k0m r∗〉| ≥ ǫ4βk0 be at most
δǫβ
4 log(1/δ)+1 (this follows from a standard Chernoff argument which we omit; Lemma 6 contains a
superset of the necessary ideas). Therefore, by union bounding over the 4 log(1/δ)ǫβ possible T as well
as T0, with probability 1−2δ we have |〈T, r˜− k0m r∗〉| ≤ ǫ4βk0 for whichever T we end up accepting,
as well as for T = T0.
Consequently, we have
〈T, r∗〉 ≥ m
k0
〈T, r˜′〉 − ǫ
4
βm (59)
≥ m
k0
〈T0, r˜′〉 − 2ǫ
4
βm (60)
≥ 〈T0, r∗〉 − 3ǫ
4
βm (61)
≥ 〈 1|C|
∑
i∈C
M˜i, r
∗〉 − ǫβm, (62)
where the final step is Lemma 3. By scaling down the failure probability δ by a constant (to account
for the probability of failure at each step of the above argument), Proposition 2 follows.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 2
By Proposition 1, for k = Ω
(
1
βα3ǫ4 max
(
1, mn
))
, we can recover a matrix M˜ sat-
isfying 1|C|
1
βm
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m](M
∗
ij − T ∗j )A∗ij ≤ ǫ, and hence by (5) M˜ also satisfies
1
|C|
1
βm
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m](M
∗
ij − T ∗j )r∗j ≤ L · ǫ+ ǫ0.
By Proposition 2, we then recover a set T satisfying
1
βm
∑
j∈T
r∗j ≥

 1
βm
1
|C|
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m]
M˜ijr
∗
j

− ǫ (63)
≥

 1
βm
1
|C|
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈[m]
T ∗j r
∗
j

 − [(L+ 1) · ǫ+ ǫ0] (64)
=

 1
βm
∑
j∈T∗
r∗j

− [(L + 1) · ǫ + ǫ0], (65)
as was to be shown.
B Examples of Adversarial Behavior
In this section, in order to provide some intuition we show two possible attacks that adversaries
could employ to make it hard for us to recover the good items. The first attack creates a symmetric
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situation, whereby there are 1α indistinguishable sets of potentially good items, and we are therefore
forced to consider each set before we can find out which one is actually good. The second attack
demonstrates the necessity of constraining each row to have a fixed sum, by showing that adversaries
that are allowed to create very dense rows can have disproportionate influence on nuclear norm-
based recovery algorithms
B.1 Necessity of Nuclear Norm Scaling
Suppose for simplicity that α = β and n = m. Let J be the αn× αn all-ones matrix, and suppose
that the full rating matrix A has a block structure:
A∗ =


J (1− ǫ)J · · · (1− ǫ)J
(1− ǫ)J J · · · (1− ǫ)J
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(1− ǫ)J (1− ǫ)J · · · J

 (66)
In other words, both the items and raters are partitioned into 1α blocks, each of size αn. A rater
assigns a rating of 1 to everything in their corresponding block, and a rating of 1 − ǫ to everything
outside of their block. Thus, there are 1α completely symmetric blocks, only one of which corre-
sponds to the good raters. Since we do not know which of these blocks is actually good, we need to
include them all in our solution M∗. Therefore, M∗ should be
M∗ =


J 0 · · · 0
0 J · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · J

 (67)
Note however that in this case, ‖M∗‖∗ = n, while
√
αβnm =
√
α2n2 = αn. We therefore need
the nuclear norm constraint in (1) to be at least 1α times larger than
√
αβnm in order to capture the
solution M∗ above.
It is not obvious to us that the additional 2ǫ factor appearing in (1) is actually necessary, but it was
needed in our analysis in order to bound the impact of adversaries.
B.2 Necessity of Row Normalization
Suppose that we did not include the row-normalization constraint
∑
j M˜ij ≤ βm in (1). For in-
stance, this might happen if, instead of seeking all items of quality above a given quantile, we
sought all items with quality above a given threshold (say, whose quality was great than 12 ). In this
case we might pose the optimization problem
maximize 〈A˜− 12Jn,m,M〉, (68)
subject to 0 ≤Mij ≤ 1 ∀i, j,
‖M‖∗ ≤ 2
αǫ
√
αβnm,
where Jn,m is the n × m all-ones matrix. There are several reasons not to do this (for instance,
focusing on quality thresholds rather than quantile thresholds loses the robustness to monotonic
transformations that our method enjoys). In this section, we will focus on the particular issue that
(68) is less robust to adversaries than (1).
Concretely, we will suppose that the adversaries are split into 13β
(
1
α − 1
)
blocks of size 3αβn, each
of which rates a random subset of m2 items positively and the rest negatively. So for instance the
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matrix A∗ might look like (with α = 25 , β = 16 , n = 10,m = 12):
A∗ =




go
o
d
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ba
d
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
ba
d
2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
ba
d
3 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
(69)
The nuclear norm of each individual bad block is
√
3
2αβnm, and because the blocks are chosen
independently of each other, the nuclear norm will be approximately additive across blocks. In
addition, including a given bad block increases 〈A˜ − 12J,M〉 by 34αβnm. In contrast, including
the good block increases the nuclear norm by
√
αβnm and only increases the objective by 12αβnm.
The bad blocks therefore all give more “bang for the buck” in terms of how much they increase the
objective vs. how much much they increase the nuclear norm, so we will add them before the good
block.
To accomodate all these bad blocks, we need to allow ‖M‖∗ to be at least roughly 13β
(
1
α − 1
) ×√
3
2αβnm = Ω
(
1
αβ
√
αβnm
)
, which is adds an extra factor of 1β relative to when we constrain
the column sum. The issue can be seen in the above construction in (69): if we do not normalize the
rows, then the rows controlled by adversaries can exert disproportionate influence (up to a factor of
1
β ) by creating columns that are much denser than those of the reliable raters.
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